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legislation might not disturb any vested substantive rights by
retroactively changing the law that applies to already completed
events.
Since Arizona follows the prior appropriation doctrine, it is
impermissible for subsequent legislation to change the legal effect of
acts that resulted in acquisition and priority of water rights. Thus, any
implementation of the retroactive intent to affect vested substantive
rights to water creates a due process violation. The court listed the
specific statutes in question and declared them invalid due to their
potential alteration of past events.
The second issue pertaining to House Bill 2276 was whether these
provisions also violated the separation of powers doctrine. This issue
addressed the invalidation of statutes pertaining to de minimis use, onfarm water duties, maximum capacity rules, settlement agreements,
prior filing presumptions, the role of the Arizona Department of
Water Resources, changes regarding the special master, and public
trust. The court held some of the provisions violative of separation of
powers. An equal protection question also arose within this analysis;
however, the court held that none of the statutes in question violated
equal protection principles.
The court then analyzed House Bill 2193. It recognized that the
previous analyses applied to many of these statutes, thereby
invalidating them. The court then decided to strike down the statutes
in their entirety, and let the Legislature decide whether to reenact the
provisions that satisfied constitutional requirements.

Melinda B. Barton

COLORADO
Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, No.
97SA343, slip op. at 1 (Colo. Mar. 29, 1999) (holding that volumetric
limitations will not be implied as a matter of law upon an earlier
change in use decree, fully litigated as to its terms and conditions).
The City of Golden ("Golden") applied for a change in use of its
decreed Priority 12 water rights in Clear Creek to use the water for
municipal purposes. In September 1995, several junior appropriators
in Clear Creek filed objections to the application, asserting injury to
their vested rights because Golden had expanded its water use beyond
the scope decreed.
The Clear Creek Priority 12 water right, initially decreed in
October 1884, carried an appropriation date of May 1861. The City of
Golden, appellee, and Consolidated Mutual Ditch Company
("Consolidated Mutual") are the majority holders of Priority 12 rights.
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Appellants own Clear Creek water rights junior to Priority 12. The
water court decreed Golden's share of Priority 12 water in two 1960's
proceedings. These decrees expressly quantified Golden's Priority 12
rights based on historic consumptive use. They gave Golden the right
to annually divert water up to 4.66 cubic feet per second ("c.f.s."), from
May through October. The water court required Golden to abandon
part of its flow entitlement to protect junior users. The Colorado
Supreme Court decided the existence of express flow limitations in the
1960's change decrees precluded appellants' claim. Thus, courts may
not read acre-foot volumetric limitations into Golden's Priority 12
decrees, as a matter of law.
Courts traditionally quantified Colorado water rights using a twopart measurement. First, the court determined the rate of flow
measured in cubic feet per second. Second, the court adjusted that
amount, if necessary, to account for historic consumption and the
proposed use.
The court used this method to determine the
Georgetown's 1960's decrees. Since the passage of the 1969 Water
Rights Determination and Administration Act, Colorado has been
firmly committed to the idea of using volumetric limitations in overappropriated basins. Clear Creek is such a basin. In modem change
decrees, the court generally imposed an acre-foot limitation on the
amount of water it allowed an appropriator yearly. Appellants here
urged the court to impose such an acre-foot volumetric limitation on
Golden. They argued that Golden's water engineer, Gary Thompson,
had already implied this measurement in a 1993 case involving
Consolidated Mutual.
The first change decree proceeding began in 1957 when Golden
approached James Mannon and William Vaughn, the then owners of
the Priority 12 rights, seeking to purchase them. Before sale, the
owners had the courts change their decree by changing uses from
irrigation to municipal. At the hearing, Golden's expert water
engineer, W.W. Wheeler, testified that the change in use would not
harm junior right holders. Golden would balance its municipal use to
consume an equivalent amount as that used for irrigation. Wheeler
determined that transferring 2.86 cubic feet per second to Golden
would not injure junior users. The water court denied Mannon and
Vaughn's petition. On appeal the Colorado Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case to the water court to determine whether a
change decree with limiting conditions would prevent injury to
juniors. In 1961, before the case was re-heard, the parties entered into
a court-approved consent decree.
The consent decree limited
Golden's maximum annual diversion to 2.86 cubic feet per second.
The court imposed three conditions for approval including the
removal of Mannon and Vaughn's land from irrigation, the
abandonment back to Clear Creek of .84 c.f.s., and a diversion
limitation allowing use between May and October.
Golden's second Priority 12 decree arose out of a 1964 purchase of
1.8 c.f.s. from then owners Mauz and Thuet. The second decree also
involved a change in use from agricultural irrigation to municipal
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consumption. Again W.W. Wheeler determined that transferring 1.8
c.f.s. to Golden for municipal use would not injure junior Clear Creek
appropriators. The 1964 decree contained similar conditions as the
1961 decree, including limiting Golden's diversions to the period of
May through October each year. Importantly, neither of these 1960's
decrees involved an acre-foot volumetric limitation on Golden's annual
consumption.
In 1993, Consolidated Mutual applied to change the use of its
Priority 12 rights, from agricultural to municipal use. Golden objected
arguing the change in use would injure Golden's Priority 12 rights
unless the court imposed volumetric limitations on Consolidated
Mutual's decree. By computing the average total consumptive use of
Priority 12 water at 411 acre-feet, and subtracting the amount allocated
Golden in the 1960's decrees, Gary Thompson arrived at an acre-foot
volumetric limitation on Consolidated Mutual's share of Priority 12. In
determining Consolidated Mutual's share of Priority 12, Thompson
implied Golden's remaining acre-foot share. Thompson determined
Consolidated Mutual's share of Priority 12 was 124 acre-feet per year,
and by implication set Golden's share of Priority 12 at 287 acre-feet per
year. It is this implied volumetric limitation of Golden's share of
Priority 12 that appellants sought to have the court read into Golden's
current change of use application.
The water court imposed
Thompson's 124 acre-feet per year volumetric limitation on
Consolidated Mutual's decree of Priority 12 in approving its change in
use application.
The current litigation began in 1995 when appellants filed claims
in District Court, Water Division No. 1, against Golden alleging the city
had infringed on their junior rights by expanding its water use beyond
that decreed in the 1960's proceedings. Appellants brought three
claims against Golden. First, due to the 1993 Consolidated Mutual
litigation and Gary Thompson's findings, these had established a 287
acre-feet per year volumetric limitation of Golden's Priority 12 rights.
Additionally, Golden's use had exceeded its 287 acre-feet per year
amount, injuring junior Clear Creek appropriators. Appellants argued
the court should read this limitation into Golden's 1960's decrees as a
matter of law. Second, appellants contended that Golden had
impermissibly expanded its use by changing its use pattern from peak
flow use to base flow use. Peak flow rights satisfy municipal demand
during the summer months, while base flow rights satisfy municipal
demand outside of the summer months. Finally, appellants alleged
Golden had impermissibly enlarged its use by increasing the lawn
acreage it irrigated with Priority 12 water.
In response, Golden filed a motion to dismiss. The city claimed
the court should bar, under claim preclusion, the modification
requested by appellants, to establish a volumetric limitation for each of
Golden's 1960's decrees of Priority 12 use. The appellants filed a crossmotion for partial summary judgment arguing issue preclusion and
judicial estoppel relating to the Consolidated Mutual litigation and a
1994 report Golden filed with the State Water Commissioner
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regarding its water transfers for that year. Its 1994 transfers exceeded
Wheeler and Thompson's estimates of historic consumptive use under
the 1960's decrees. The water court denied both motions.
The water court reasoned that, after interpreting Orr v. Arapahoe
Water & Sanitation District, appellants' claims were permissible as they
were not previously litigated and asserted injury resulting from
Golden's expanded use. The water court determined that the 1960's
decrees conferred the right to change the point of diversion, and to
change the use to municipal uses, but that the decrees included an
implied volumetric limitation preventing Golden from expanding the
historical consumption of its Priority 12 rights. In denying appellants'
cross-motion for summary judgment, the water court found that Gary
Thompson's testimony in the Consolidated Mutual litigation did not
judicially estop Golden from arguing against modifying its prior
decrees to reflect volumetric limitations. The water court did not
address the appellants issue preclusion argument.
The trial began in May 1997. Expert testimony covered all three of
the appellants' claims of injury. The water court reversed its 1996
holding that Golden's change decrees were subject to implied
volumetric limitations. Contrary to its initial interpretation of Orrthat decrees are subject to implied volumetric limitations as a matter of
law-the court instead decided Orr requires courts "imply volumetric
limitations in decrees when historical consumptive use was not at issue
in an earlier proceeding." Because the parties already litigated both
the historic consumptive use and the future municipal consumptive
use associated with Golden's Priority 12 rights in the 1960's change
decree proceedings, the water court could not imply volumetric
limitations into those decrees. The court also rejected appellants'
attempts to bind Golden to Thompson's 1993 testimony with issue
preclusion and judicial estoppel.
Regarding the appellants' second claim of injury resulting from
Golden's changing its pattern of use from peak flow to base flow, the
court agreed with Thompson that there had been no change in
Golden's pattern of use in forty years. The court made no finding
regarding the third injury asserted by the appellants. They claimed
injury from Golden's increasing the total lawn acreage irrigated with
Priority 12 water. Appellants appealed the decision to the Colorado
Supreme Court.
The supreme court agreed with the water court and barred the
appellants' request that the court read the implied volumetric
limitations into the express terms of Golden's 1960's decrees under
claim preclusion. Affirming the water court's analysis of Orr, the
supreme court found that implied volumetric limitations were
developed to prevent injury to juniors when a prior change decree did
not address or contemplate the question of historic consumptive use.
The court also found support from its decision in In re Application for
Water Rights of Midway Ranches Property Owners Ass'n, about the
preclusive effect of a prior quantification of historical consumptive use
The court thus denied
on a subsequent augmentation plan.
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appellants' claim under Orr,as Golden's 1960's decrees addressed the
historic consumptive use of Priority 12 water. The supreme court
rejected appellants' motion for partial summary judgment on issue
preclusion grounds.
The court decided that the appellants' second and third claims of
injury were not precluded, and addressed each. The appellants'
second claim was that Golden had expanded its use beyond the c.f.s.
limitations decreed in the 1960s by changing its pattern of use from a
peak flow to a base flow. The court accepted the water court's factual
conclusions as sufficiently supported by the record. The water court
had relied on and accepted Gary Thompson's testimony that Golden
had not changed its pattern of use in forty years. As the water court
failed to address the appellants' third claim, regarding the increase in
law acreage irrigated by Golden's Priority 12 water, the supreme court
remanded the issue for determination of the validity of the claim.

Chip Cutler

In re Title, Ballot Title, & Submission Clause v. Brandon, 960 P.2d 672
(Colo. 1998) (holding that in setting the title for a proposed statutory
amendment, the initiative title setting board did not abuse its
discretion by omitting the definition of the term "nonexempt well,"
and that the fiscal impact statement which did not specify which
"taxpayers" a possible refund provision would effect did not mislead
voters).
The Title Initiative Setting Board ("Board") fixed a title, ballot title
and submission clause, and summary for a proposed statutory
amendment. The amendment called for the installation of water
meters by the state engineer on all wells in the unconfined aquifer in
Water Division 3, which were not exempt pursuant to Colorado
Revised Statutes § 37-92-601 and § 37-92-602. The initiative summary
included a fiscal impact statement ("Impact Statement") which
outlined the costs associated with the proposed amendment. The
Impact Statement indicated that due to state spending limits, the state
might have to refund some fee revenues generated by the initiative to
taxpayers.
Registered voters petitioned the court to review the action taken by
the Board claiming that the titles and summary misled the electorate
because the Board failed to (i) properly define the term "non-exempt"
well; and (ii) specify which taxpayers might be entitled to a tax refund,
and therefore abused its discretion.
The court explained that the scope of review in such a case is
limited to ensuring that the title, ballot title and submission clause,
and summary fairly reflect the proposed initiative in a way that does

